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I. INTRODUCTION

Most children are born in the United States as a result of consensual
adult sex.' In this country, genetic ties between a man and a child often
2
do not determine legal paternity. Conversely, many states presume that
a man has both legal paternity and genetic ties to a child if he is married
to the child's biological mother. 3 However, if a child's biological mother
is unmarried, the child's genetic father is more likely to successfully
claim paternity interests. For instance, in Lehr v. Robertson, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized that such interests implicate federal
constitutional protection of "life, liberty, or property" and thus warrant
4
guarantees of fair procedure during adoption proceedings. Moreover, the
f Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., 1970,
Colby College; J.D., 1974, University of Chicago.
1. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Deserting Mothers, Abandoned Babies, Lost Fathers:
Dangers in Safe Havens, 24 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 335, 340 (2006).
2. See, e.g., CAL. FAm. CODE § 7611 (West 2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §
45/5(a)(1) (West 2008).
3. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2008) (stating a "man is presumed to be
father of a child" born to his wife); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/5(a)(1)
natural
the
(West 2008) (presuming fatherhood when "child is born or conceived" during a
marriage). Incidentally, there are no presumed maternity interests for wives whose
husbands father children outside the marriage. See, e.g., Amy G. v. M.W., 142 Cal. App.
4th 1, 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d 2006).
4. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (declaring federal constitution may
compel State to consider biological father's opinion "of where the child's best interests
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U.S. Supreme Court, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., concluded that a
genetic father has the "unique opportunity" to develop a relationship with
his offspring if the child's biological mother is unmarried under federal
constitutional law,5 although similar paternity opportunities may not be
available to genetic fathers of children born to mothers who are married
to other men. 6 Under Lehr and Michael H., 7 when paternity schemes
systematically and unfairly interfere with men who wish, or might wish,
to pursue their paternity opportunities, these schemes should fail.8 The
Lehr court specifically recognized that governmental systems that likely
omit "many responsible fathers"
for reasons beyond their "control" may
9
be "procedurally inadequate."
Unfortunately, contemporary American paternity schemes now
frequently omit "many responsible fathers" who have little or no
"control" over the "unique opportunity" to develop a parent-child
relationship. Often these omissions undercut rather than promote general
policies underlying paternity laws. The omissions can be easily reduced,
if not ended. Relevant public policies involve dual parenthood and
equality. In particular, current state birth certificate, safe haven and
adoption schemes are flawed. Suggested reforms will be presented after a
brief review of genetic father "control" and the "unique" paternity
opportunity interest under Lehr, the general requirements for
procedurally adequate paternity regimes, the policies guiding
lie," provided that biological father develops "a relationship with his offspring" and
accepts "some measure of responsibility for the child's future").
5. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 128 (1989).
6. Id. at 128-30 (finding that conclusive paternity presumption favoring husband
under state law is permitted under federal constitution). But see State ex. rel. Cihlar v.
Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172 (Tenn. App. 2000) (holding that one-time conclusive
presumption favoring husband is rebuttable).
7. Some state law precedents expand paternity opportunity interests beyond those
required by Lehr, Michael H., and subsequent federal constitutional cases. See Callender
v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (holding genetic father of child born into
marriage of genetic mother and husband could nevertheless seek to overcome the
husband's paternity, although he was an "established father"), aff'd Callender v. Skiles,
623 N.W.2d 852 (Iowa 2001) (terminating husband's rights).
8. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262-64; Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128-30. The traditional test
for procedurally unfair governmental schemes infringing upon federal constitutional "life,
liberty or property" interests involves the three-pronged strict scrutiny approach.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Where such interests arise initially only from
state law, the breadth of procedural safeguards is narrower than where such interests arise
under an independent federal substantive due process analysis. See Pena v. Mattox, 84
F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that predeprivation governmental hearings
"dealing with parental rights" warrant "a higher order of procedural protection" when
independent federal substantive due process liberty interests are implicated).
9. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
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contemporary American paternity laws, and the unfairness of current
birth certificate, safe haven and adoption schemes.

II. PATERNITY OPPORTUNITY INTERESTS
Under the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lehr v. Robertson, many
genetic fathers have constitutionally protected opportunities for paternity
under law when the genetic mothers of their children are unmarried at all
times from conception to birth. 10 Fathers secure legal paternity when
they establish in a timely fashion "significant custodial, personal, or
financial" relationships with their offspring." Unfortunately, neither
Lehr nor its progeny fully describe how such relationships are
successfully established. They seemingly do require, however, that the
chance for legal paternity for at least a very young child usually not be
lost when the genetic father had no control over establishing the requisite
relationship.' 2 Paternity opportunity interests now differ significantly
from state to state, with many uncertainties and technical pitfalls.
Unfortunately, some states find that Lehr allows the denial of paternity
opportunities to genetic fathers who fail to establish significant parentchild relationships because of simple "ignorance," "grudging and
crabbed" legal doctrines, or genetic mothers or others who conceal
children.1 3 These approaches do not necessarily follow from Lehr and
run contrary to the prevailing public policies underlying paternity laws.
Lehr requires that the control over paternity establishments by genetic
fathers be real, not fictitious, even when alternative parentage plans, such
as adoptions by strangers, seemingly offer the children better chances for
good lives. 14 Legal parents have never been denied custody or visitation
rights simply because genetic strangers would likely make better parents.
In Lehr, the story of the birth of Jessica to an unmarried couple,
Lorraine and Jonathan, yielded vastly different opinions in the Supreme
16
Court. 15 Six justices emphasized Lorraine's story, while three focused
on Jonathan's. 17 Lorraine had "married Richard Robertson eight months
10. Id. at 252. Genetic fathers whose paternity arose from illegal sexual conduct
typically are excluded from these protections. See, e.g., Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894, 900
(7th Cir. 1996) (excluding genetic father from protections when child was conceived in
case of statutory rape).
11. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
12. Id.
dissenting).
13. Id. at 275 (White, J.,
14. Id.
15. Id. at 270.
16. Id. at 250-52.
17. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-69.
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after Jessica's birth." 18 Robertson then sought to adopt Jessica shortly
after Jessica's second birthday in December 1978.19 Jonathan, the
biological father, contested the adoption, arguing that he was entitled to
advance notice of the adoption proceeding and opportunity to be heard.2 °
Jonathan filed a separate paternity petition in January 1979.21 In March
1979, the Family Court of Ulster County, New York granted Richard's
adoption request. 22
Under New York statutory law, a genetic father of a child born to an
unmarried woman was entitled to notice only if: (1) he had filed his
name in "the putative father registry;" (2) he had been adjudicated to be
the father, "identified as the father on the child's birth certificate," or
"identified as the father by the mother in a sworn written statement;" (3)
he had married the mother before the child was six months old; or, (4) he
had lived "openly" with the child and the child's mother while holding
himself out as the child's father.2 3 Conceding that he did not meet any of
the statutory requirements, 24 Jonathan urged that "special circumstances
gave him a constitutional right to notice and a hearing before Jessica was
adopted., 25 Those circumstances included the filing by Jonathan of "a
visitation and paternity petition" in a New York court about a month
after the adoption proceeding began, before any adoption order was
signed. 26
A month after filing his paternity petition, Jonathan learned of
Robertson's adoption petition.27 Four days later, Jonathan sought to halt
Richardson's adoption proceeding so that only his paternity case would
proceed.28 The adoption court judge responded to Jonathan's request for
18. Id. at 250.
19. In re Adoption of Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979).
20. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 251-52 (discussing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 -a) (McKinney 2008)).
24. The concession was made though Jonathan alleged that he and Lorraine
cohabitated for about two years, until Jessica's birth, that Lorraine disappeared with
Jessica right after birth, and that Lorraine acknowledged Jonathan's paternity to friends
and relatives during her pregnancy. Id. at 268-69. In other situations, this may satisfy the
"living openly" and "holding out" requirements of adoption laws on when participation
rights arise for unwed genetic fathers.
25. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252.
26. Id. at 252. Jonathan filed the paternity petition on January 30, 1979. Martz, 423
N.Y.S.2d at 380. Process was served on Lorraine on February 22, 1979. Id.
27. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253. On March 3, 1979, Jonathan was served a copy of
Lorraine's motion in the adoption case for consolidation with the paternity case. In re
Adoption of Jessica XX, 430 N.E.2d 896, 897 (N.Y. 1981).
28. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253.
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29
a stay by indicating the adoption order was signed earlier that day. By
3
0
then, the judge was aware of Jonathan's pending paternity case. The
adoption 31court judge concluded that notice to Jonathan was not
required.
Two New York appellate courts sustained Jessica's adoption.32 The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed in part on the basis that Jonathan
"made no tender indicating any ability to provide any particular or
special information relevant to Jessica's best interest. 3 3 Accordingly,
any notice afforded to Jonathan would not have furthered the purpose of
such notice. 34 The purpose of such notice was to enable a genetic father
"to provide the [adoption] court with evidence concerning the best
interest of the child. 3 5 Furthermore, the appellate court made several
observations. First, it noted that Jonathan knew where Lorraine was even
before he petitioned for visitation and paternity. 36 Second, it observed
that Jonathan never filed a statutory notice of intention to claim paternity,
which would have assured him participation rights in any adoption proceeding under New York law. 37 Lastly, it remarked that Jonathan did not
application to intervene in the adoption case once he
make a "prompt"
38
it.
of
learned
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the only legal issues
were: (1) "whether the New York statutes are unconstitutional because
they inadequately protect the natural relationship between parent and
child," and (2) whether these statutes "draw an impermissible3 9distinction
between the rights of the mother and the rights of the father.

29. Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
30. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252-53. See also Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 384 (acknowledging
that trial judge learned of paternity action when Lorraine sought change of venue of
paternity case to court where the adoption case was pending). It was unclear whether
Richard "had any actual or imputed knowledge" of Jonathan's claim to the fatherhood.
Id.
31. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253.
32. Id. at 253-54.
33. Id. at 255.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Jessica X, 430 N.E.2d at 901.
37. Id.
38. Id. In his dissent, the Chief Judge noted that Jonathan would have reasonably
thought that a filing of statutory notice by him was "a meaningless act," since Jonathan
knew that the adoption judge was aware of the paternity case before the adoption was
finalized. Id. at 904 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting). Additionally, the Chief Judge noted that a
"prompt" intervention between Saturday, March 3, and Tuesday, March 6, reasonably
may have seemed unnecessary to Jonathan as Lorraine's venue request before the
adoption court was "returnable" on March 12. Id. at 904-05.
39. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255.
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Regarding the rights that flow from "the natural relationship between
parent and child, 4 ° six Supreme Court justices distinguished between an
unwed genetic father who had formed a "significant custodial, personal,
or financial relationship" 41 with his child, thereby acquiring "substantial"
federal constitutional childrearing interests, and an unwed genetic father
who had not yet formed such a relationship.42 In Lehr, the majority found
that Jonathan had not formed a significant relationship with Jessica and
that he had not sought "to establish a legal tie until after she was two
years old., 43 Consequently, the issue was not the "adequacy of New
York's procedure for terminating a developed relationship," but whether
New York had sufficiently protected Jonathan's "opportunity to form" a
parent-child relationship with Jessica.4 4 The majority found there was
adequate protection.45
The Supreme Court thus deemed "procedurally adequate" the New
York statutory conditions regarding advance notice of adoption
proceedings to. unwed genetic fathers.46 The Court observed that "the
right to receive notice" was completely within Jonathan's "control" and
that he simply needed to mail a postcard to the putative father registry. 7
Jonathan's ignorance of the putative father registry requirement was no
defense.4 8 The Court rejected Jonathan's plea that his case was "special"
because both the adoption court and the mother were aware of his
pending paternity petition before the adoption order was entered. 49 Thus,
the Court refused to make an exception for special circumstances,
reasoning that strict compliance with the statutes served the public
interest of facilitating expeditious adoptions of young children. s
Furthermore, the Court noted that the New York scheme was fair

40. Id.
41. Id. at 262.
42. Id. at 261-62. Specifically the court said: "When an unwed father demonstrates a
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate
in the rearing of his child,' his interest . . . acquires substantial protection .... But the
mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection."
Id. at 261.
43. Id. at 262-63.
44. Id. at 263-65.
45. Id. at 265.
46. Id. at 264.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 264-65.
50. Id. at 264-65.
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because Jonathan was "presumptively capable of asserting and
protecting" his own rights. 5'
Regarding the distinction between maternal and paternal rights, the
relation between the
court recognized the need for "a substantial
,,52
adoption procedure
state
The
purpose.
disparity and an important state
parents in that
genetic
distinguished between women and men who were
it allowed all mothers, but not all fathers, "the right to veto an adoption
53
and the right to prior notice of any adoption proceeding." According to
the Court, the distinction served three objectives: (1) promoting "the best
interests of the child;" (2) protecting "the rights of interested third
parties;" and (3) securing prompt and final adoptions of nonmarital
kids.5 4 To achieve these objectives, the New York laws afforded veto
and participation rights only to genetic parents who had established, and
not later abandoned, "custodial, personal, or financial" relationships with
their children. 5
By giving birth, genetic mothers have always established parentchild relationships. 56 However, the Court observed that only certain
putative fathers could claim such a relationship, usually through the
57
process of legitimization or active participation in-childrearing. The
high court found the New York statutes sufficiently recognized unwed
genetic fathers who came forward to participate in childrearing, noting
that the statutory scheme did not likely "omit many responsible
fathers." 5 8 The Court seemingly concluded the New York statutes
adequately protected genetic fathers because the right to receive notice
59
was entirely within these fathers' "control.
The dissenters in Lehr focused more on Jonathan's story, which
resulted in a very different conclusion about the adequacy of protection
60
afforded Jonathan's natural relationship with Jessica. According to
Jonathan, whose factual account was never subject to an evidentiary
51. Id. (stating further that Jonathan's argument "amounts to nothing more than an
indirect attack on the notice provisions of the New York statute").
52. Id. at 265 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976)).
53. Id. at 266. The state endowed mothers with this right, assuming no earlier parental
rights termination. Id.
54. Id. at 266-67.
55. Id.
56. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62-63 (2001) ("In the case of the mother, the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself. The mother's status is documented in most
instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her
having given birth.").
57. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266-67.
58. Id. at 264.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 268-71 (White, J., dissenting).
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hearing, Jonathan and Lorraine "cohabited for approximately two years,
until Jessica's birth.",61 During this time Lorraine acknowledged to
friends and relatives that Jonathan was Jessica's father.62 Later, when
Lorraine sought public aid, she reported to the Department of Social
Services that Jonathan was the father. 63 Jonathan "visited Lorraine and
' 64
Jessica in the hospital every day during Lorraine's confinement.
However, upon discharge from the hospital, Lorraine largely concealed
her whereabouts from Jonathan for nearly a year, though he sporadically
located her and visited with Lorraine, Jessica, and Lorraine's other child
"to the extent" Lorraine was willing. 65 From August 1977 to August
1978, Jonathan was unable to locate Lorraine and Jessica, though he
never ceased looking for them. 66 Jonathan located them again in August
1978 "with the aid of a detective agency. 67 By that time, Lorraine was
married to Richard Robertson.6 8 Jonathan maintained that he offered to
furnish financial assistance and to establish a trust fund for Jessica, but
Lorraine refused. 69 Lorraine also rejected Jonathan's request to visit
70
Jessica and "threatened" him "with arrest unless he stayed away."
Jonathan subsequently retained counsel who wrote to Lorraine in early
December 1978, requesting visitation for Jonathan and threatening legal
action. 7 1 The Robertsons' adoption petition, which they filed on
72
December 21, 1978, closely followed Jonathan's retention of counsel.
The adoption was granted on March 7, 1979, though Jonathan had filed a
paternity petition in January, 1979 and though he claimed he only
73
learned of the adoption proceeding on March 3, 1979.
With this "far different picture," the dissenters concluded "that but
for the actions" of Lorraine, Jonathan would have developed a
relationship with Jessica that warranted full veto and participation rights
in the adoption case.74 The dissent also looked to a 1980 statutory
amendment in New York that guaranteed a genetic father's right to
consent to adoption when he was "prevented" from establishing a
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 269.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id. at 270-72.
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significant parent-child relationship by the genetic mother or another
"having lawful custody of the child."05 The dissent seemingly concluded
that blood ties, together with interference and an inquiring genetic father
who parented for some time and wished to parent, were sufficient
circumstances to prompt adoption notice and participation rights.76
The dissenters viewed the filing of the paternity petition as
comparable to the statutory factors affording to genetic fathers
affirmative rights during adoptions. 77 Noting that Jonathan's "identity
and interest" was as clearly and easily ascertainable as those of fathers
falling under the statutory categories, 78 the dissent observed that failure
to provide him with the same rights constituted the "sheerest
formalism." 79 Such formalism failed to serve the government's goals of
68
the child's best interest and of expeditious and conclusive adoptions.
Finally, the dissenters implied that states could better ensure a
genetic father's participation in adoption proceedings by requiring an
unwed genetic mother "to divulge" the name of the child's biological
father. 81 The dissent observed that states could even do so when it is the
spouse of the genetic mother, like Richard Robertson, who seeks an
adoption. 82 The dissent further remarked that governments already
where
require such identifications in other settings, including situations
83
mothers seek public assistance on behalf of their children.
Both the majority and the dissent in Lehr recognized that unwed
genetic fathers possess constitutionally-protected paternity opportunity
interests in their offspring born to unwed mothers. Even the majority,
with its more limited view, expressed concerns about the validity of state
adoption schemes that deny paternity opportunities to men who had no
"control" over establishing paternity or that likely omit many
"responsible fathers." 84 Jonathan arguably had "control" as he knew of
the pregnancy and birth and as he could have filed his name in the
registry sometime before Jessica turned two. 85 However, it would be
75. Id. at 271 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. Law § 11 l(l)(d)).
76. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 272-74.
77. Id. at 272.
78. Id. at 274.
79. Id. at 275.
80. Id.
81. Id.at 273.
82. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 273.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 264.
85. Like the New York Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that
Jonathan did not exert "control" because he could have made a "prompt" application to
intervene in the adoption case. Id. at 253. Jonathan did show up at the adoption
which was not "prompt"
learned of it,
proceeding, but itwas four days after he first
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considerably harder to determine whether Jonathan had "control" if he
only knew about his sexual encounter with Lorraine and was therefore in
the dark about Lorraine's pregnancy and Jessica's birth. On these facts,
would the U.S. Supreme Court rule that Jonathan would still be required
to register his sexual encounter with Lorraine before birth or very shortly
thereafter in order to secure participation rights in a proposed adoption of
Jessica very shortly after her birth?
III. PROCEDURALLY ADEQUATE PATERNITY SCHEMES

The guarantees of fair governmental systems are extended under
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions, including Lehr, to many nonpaternity settings. Generally, individuals with "life, liberty, or property"
interests cannot be subjected to unfair deprivations. For example, in
Parratt v. Taylor, a prisoner complained that his hobby kit package,
though delivered to the prison, never arrived at his cell, thereby
depriving him of "life, liberty or property" protected by federal
procedural due process. 86 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the
prisoner had a viable constitutional claim if the postal delivery system
was "inadequate" in protecting the mail, as long as it was "practicable for
the State" to provide greater protection. 87 No matter what postdeprivation remedy was available to the prisoner to recover the cost of
the hobby kit, the governmental system was inadequate where "predeprivation safeguards would be of use in preventing the kind of' loss
alleged.88

The 1978 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Monell v. Department of
Social Services spoke to the need for fair governmental procedures in a
different setting.89 In Monell, the Court held that unfair schemes
infringing upon a person's constitutional interests can prompt
institutional and individual liability9" under a provision of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.91 Thus, a municipal social services department and a
municipal school board, even without vicarious liability, could be held
accountable to pregnant employees who were subjected to unfair leave of
enough for the majority. Id. at 252-54. Further, the majority did not address whether
Jonathan could have been found to have lived "openly" with Lorraine and their unborn
child under the New York statute. Id. at 251-52.
86. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981).
87. Id. at 543.
88. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138-39 (stating that loss could not be caused by
government officers' "random, unauthorized" acts).
89. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

90. Id. at 690-91.

91. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (defining "person" under Civil Rights Act of 1871).
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absence schemes that originated from the "execution of a government's
policy or custom, whether made by lawmakers or by 92those whose edicts
policy."
or acts may fairly be said to represent official

Borrowing from Monell, the 1998 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School spoke to public school liability
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 93 In Gebser, the
Court held that institutional, as compared to individual, liability arose
only if a governmental unit engages in intentional discrimination directly
through "official policy" or if the unit knew of discrimination by94a
action.
teacher or student and deliberately decided not to take remedial
A few recent federal circuit court rulings further demonstrate how
flawed government schemes can prompt institutional responsibility for
deprivations of "life, liberty or property." For instance, the Fifth Circuit
found in Stotter v. Univ. of Texas at San Antonio that Monell-type federal
procedural due process liability was possible in a case where a state
university "discarded" a professor's personal property left in his office
without affording the professor "sufficient opportunity to retrieve" his
property. 95 While notice was sent, notice was actually received by the
professor three days after his property was discarded. 96 The Fifth Circuit
held that the availability of a post-loss remedy in some state tribunal was
insufficient process where the deprivation was reasonably "predictable or
foreseeable," where a reasonable pre-loss process was available, but not
used, and where the official who discarded the97property was acting
within "authorized" (express or implied) authority.
Gebser-type liability was found possible in Simpson v. University of
Colorado. In this case, players and recruits of a state university's football
team sexually assaulted multiple women. 98 Because the head football
coach "maintained an unsupervised player-host program," even though
he had "general knowledge of the serious risk of sexual harassment and
assault during college football recruiting efforts" via knowledge of
92. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694 (observing that the schemes were allegedly unfair
because they mandated pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence before they
were medically required).

93. 524 U.S. 274 (1998); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006) (stating sex

discrimination claims are available against educational institutions receiving federal
financial assistance).
94. Simpson v. University of Colorado, 500 F. 3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007) (analyzing

cases involving Title IX, Gebser and Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe County Bd.
Of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), and recognizing their reliance on Monell).
95. Stotter v. Univ. of Texas at San Antonio, 508 F.3d 812 (5th Cir. 2007).
96. Id. at 819.
97. Id. at 822.
98. Simpson, 500 F.3d at 1184.
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similar prior assaults, the Tenth Circuit found that a due process violation
existed. 99 The Simpson court held that a jury "reasonably" could find that
"the need for more or different training" of player-hosts was obvious
because the likelihood of future Title IX violations was great and the
coach was "deliberately indifferent to the need [to prevent sexual
harassment and assaults during the university's football recruiting
efforts]."100

For paternity schemes, these cases suggest that governmental
protection of paternity opportunities is inadequate if greater protection is
"practicable" and comports with general public policies. These cases also
suggest that if past instances of paternity opportunity deprivations have
occurred where genetic fathers had no "control," then "remedial action"
is required in order to prevent future deprivations. Further, they suggest
that governments cannot be "deliberately indifferent" to the need for
more or different training of paternity law personnel who oversee
paternity schemes where some "responsible fathers" have earlier been
omitted from their children's lives without good reason.
IV. PUBLIC POLICIES UNDERLYING AMERICAN PATERNITY LAWS

Like flawed property disposal and college football recruiting
schemes, paternity designation systems can be deficient. Paternity
schemes should fail when they do not afford "practicable" opportunities
for biological dads to establish fatherhood under law for children born to
unwed mothers. 101 Today, about a million and a half children are born in
the United States each year to unwed mothers. 102 About a million of
these children have fathers recognized under law around the time of

99. Id. at 1184.
100. Id. at 1184-85.
101. Unwed mothers include, in many states, both women who were unmarried at all
times during their pregnancies and for some time after birth. Marriage during pregnancy,
but not at birth, can prompt a marital paternity presumption under law, as in A~iz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 36-334(C)(1) (2008) (stating that wed mother is a mother married "at any
time in the ten months before the birth"). Marriage after birth sometimes can also prompt
a marital paternity presumption under law. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/5(a)(2)
(West 2008) (presuming natural fatherhood with post-birth marriage and man's name on
birth certificate); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § I l-a (presuming fatherhood when marriage to
mother occurs before child is six months old).
102. See Jeffrey A. Pamess, New FederalPaternity Laws: Securing More Fathersat
Birthfor the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIs L.J. 59, 62 (2006).
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birth.' °3 Virtually all of these children have legal mothers, but these
104
children do not necessarily have legal fathers.
This disparity in parentage designation occurs even though. state
governments repeatedly pronounce they usually want both a father and a
mother under law for all children born of consensual adult sex. Dual
parenthood for non-marital kids means healthier lives for the kids 05 and
two sources of child support. 10 6 As well, the paternity statutes in
Wisconsin are founded, in part, on a state policy "to promote the interest
of children in knowing the identity of both parents."'080 7 Knowledge of
parental identity means better healthcare for the kids.
Further, lost paternity is rampant even though state governments
generally proclaim that, at least upon birth, biological mothers and
fathers of non-marital kids should be treated equally. A Delaware statute
states:

103. See id.
104. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62-63. In Nguyen, Justice Kennedy approved different
procedures for eligible women and men seeking parental rights through proof of genetic
ties. He stated:
The first governmental interest to be served is the importance of assuring that a
biological parent-child relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the
relation is verifiable from the birth itself. The mothers' status is documented in
most instances by the birth certificate or hospital records and the witnesses who
attest to her having given birth.
In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that he need not be present at
the birth. If he is present, furthermore, that circumstance is not incontrovertible
proof of fatherhood .... Fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with
regard to the proof of biological parenthood. The imposition of a different set
of rules for making that legal determination with respect to fathers and mothers
is neither surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective.
Id. Thus, even where genetic ties alone can prompt similar childrearing rights for men
and women, methods of proof usually vary.
105. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Lock, Legal Status and Effects on
Children, NOTRE DAME LEGAL STUD. PAPER No. 07-21 (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=973 826 (last visited June 16, 2008).
106. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.712(1) (West 2008) ("The parents of a
child born out of wedlock are liable for the necessary support and education of the
child.").
107. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.87, 767.89 (West 2008). See also Samantha Besson,
Enforcing the Child's Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting Approaches Under
Convention of the Right of the Child and the European Convention on Human Rights, 21
INT'L J. L., POL'Y & FAM. 137, 138-39 (2007) (observing child's right to know origins
"is now broadly recognized and respected" by European countries and international
human rights law).
108. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 7501-1.2 (B) (West 2008) ("[Legislature] seeks to
...collect and maintain social and medical information ... in the recognition that all
children should have access to knowledge about their heritage.").
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The father and mother are joint natural guardians of their minor
child and are equally charged with the child's support, care,
nurture, welfare and education. Each has equal powers and
duties with respect to such child, and neither has any right, or
presumption of right or fitness, superior to the right of the other
concerning such child's custody or any other matter affecting the
child. 109
Notwithstanding these widely-prevalent two parent and sex equality
policies, about one-half million non-marital children have a mother, but
no father, under law at the time of birth." 0 Of course, legal paternity can
later be secured via judicial actions, like Jonathan Lehr's paternity suit"1
or other proceedings." 2 But by then, healthy father-child relationships
are far more difficult to establish. Further, post-birth paternity inquiries
are often driven by child support needs or child support reimbursements
rather than by the desire for healthy parent-child relations or for sexual
equality. "3
Unfortunately, while the policies of dual parenthood and equal
treatment of mothers and fathers should be promoted by American
paternity laws, often they are not.
V. THE UNFAIRNESS OF STATE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, SAFE HAVEN AND
ADOPTION SCHEMES

A quick glance at American paternity laws in several contexts
demonstrates the systematic screwing of dads of non-marital children,
including the failure to promote dual parenthood and equality. In the
birth certificate context, federally-driven mandates 114 require that
109. 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (2008).
110. See Parness, supranote 102, at 62.
111. These proceedings may be initiated by the birth mothers, their children, the state,
or the alleged genetic fathers. The purposes of these proceedings can include: child
support, child visitation, child custody, or termination of parental rights. See, e.g., 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/7(a) (West 2008).
112. Post-birth paternity proceedings, at times, do not require initial judicial
involvement. For example, there are administrative determinations of paternity in Illinois
in cases involving "applicants for or recipients of financial aid." 305 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/10-17.7 (West 2008); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89 § 160.61 (2008).
113. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 45/7(a) (West 2008).
114. These federally driven mandates arise from federal welfare subsidies within the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program (TANF). 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)
(2006). Scholars have reviewed the federal mandates on establishing and rescinding
voluntary paternity acknowledgments. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Pamess, No Genetic Ties, No

2008]

OUT OF CONTROL PATERNITY SCHEMES

voluntary paternity acknowledgment opportunities be made available to
genetic fathers of non-marital children at hospitals shortly after birth or
at government offices thereafter. 1 5 Yet, federal and state laws say
nothing about hospital or governmental duties to secure paternity
designations for as many children as possible," 6 notwithstanding the
widely-prevalent two-parent and equality policies as well as the Lehr
court's concern about state schemes likely omitting many "responsible
fathers."' 17 However, if an unwed mother seeks welfare benefits on
behalf of her children, participation in federal welfare programs is
usually contingent upon the "good faith" efforts by the mothers to
establish legal paternity in the biological fathers."18 Thus, designated
fathers are seemingly only important when there are not only child
support needs, bVt also potential reimbursements of governmental
expenditures.
In the safe haven setting, albeit to a lesser extent, dads are similarly
screwed. American safe haven laws, which are operative in most
jurisdictions,"

9

allow mothers to abandon their newborns with no

questions asked.' 20 For example, a Kentucky statute says that when a
mother relinquishes child custody, no recipient of the child may pursue
or follow the mother, and the recipient shall respect the mother's "right
to remain anonymous."'' This statute, as well as other safe haven laws,
seems aimed at preventing child abuse and neglect. 122 Yet, safe haven
More Fathers: Voluntary Acknowledgment Recessions and Other Paternity
Disestablishments Under Illinois Law, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1295, 1298-1302 (2006).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2006). At times, such an acknowledgment is statutorily
called a "certificate of parentage." N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-41, 26:8-28.1 (West 2008).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (2006).
117. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2006).
119. Commentators have provided general reviews of the development of American
state safe haven laws and the public policies underlying them. See, e.g., Carol Sanger,
Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 CoLUM. L. REV. 753,
774-80 (2006).
120. While no questions may be asked during an abandonment, sometimes questions
are later asked. See id. at 796-97.
121. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 216B.190(3), 405.075(2) (West 2008); see also ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01(D) (West 2008) (maintaining parent who leaves newborn
infant with safe haven provider "may remain anonymous"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 398203(3) (West 2008) ("[slafe haven shall not inquire as to the identity of the custodial
parent and, if the identity of the parent is known . . .the safe haven shall keep all
information as to the identity confidential.").
122. See Sanger, supra note 119, at 778-79 (reviewing safe haven laws); see also GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-1 OA-3 (West 2008) (stating that "express intent" behind Safe Place for
Newborns Act of 2002 is "to prevent injuries to and deaths of newborn children that are
caused by a mother who abandons the newborn"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 211.951(4)
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laws can result in lost fathers whose paternity opportunity or childrearing
interests are foreclosed because safe haven personnel have no way of
knowing whether the child abandoned by a mother has a genetic father
who is in the process of stepping up to parenthood, like the father in
Lehr, or who has already completed a voluntary acknowledgment of
paternity. 123 Safe haven laws also result in too many children having no
substantial opportunity for a parent-child relationship with their
biological fathers and no opportunity of learning about their genetic
backgrounds, which is often crucial to the receipt of good medical
care. 124
Finally, in the adoption arena, when unwed mothers place their
newborns for adoption, biological fathers frequently receive no notice
and thus no practical chance for fatherhood. When the birth certificate is
blank on paternity, effective notice is difficult. In many states, notice to
genetic fathers who do not appear on birth certificates is generally only
required, as a practical matter, when the fathers previously registered
their sexual encounters with the mothers with the state. 25 Unlike
(West 2008) (denying confidentiality of identity of person placing a newborn infant with
emergency medical services provider "when indicators of child physical abuse or child
neglect are present").
123. Safe haven laws facially permit deprivations of established and potential legal
fathers' federal constitutional paternity rights when they allow mothers to abandon their
newborns anonymously and without question. Therefore, safe haven laws allow mothers
to abandon newborns without requiring them to disclose whether the newborn has a
registered father or whether a man has provided support during their pregnancies or after
the newborns' births but before abandonment. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-1 OA-4
(West 2008) (stating mother who abandons newbom less than one-week old will not be
subject to criminal prosecution; mother need not show proof of identity or address;
recipients are immune from suit if they fail to discharge their duties of intake); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-11-255 (West 2008) (stating "mother" or "purported mother" who
leaves "unharmed infant aged seventy-two (72) hours or younger" is "not required to
respond" to questions about "the identity of the mother, infant or father"). Where a
genetic father has secured childrearing rights, maternal abandonment denies him the
"presumption of superior parental rights regarding custody" without any showing of
"substantial harm" should the father have custody and without a showing that the child's
"best interest" will be undermined by the father's custody. See, e.g., In Matter of B.C.W.,
No. M2007-00168-COA-R3-JV., 2008 WL 450616 (Tenn. App. Feb. 19, 2008).
124. Commentators have provided these critiques against modern safe haven laws. See
Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative
Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 189
(2006) ("[I]nfant abandonment laws are of questionable constitutional validity" as they
"create thwarted fathers by legal design who do not enjoy even a modicum of procedural
due process."); see generally Pamess, supra note 1.
125. Recall that in Lehr, Jonathan had no effective "control" over his notice and
participation rights in Jessica's proposed adoption except if he filed his name in the
putative father registry. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. As Lorraine largely concealed her
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Jonathan Lehr, many genetic fathers will lose their children because they
failed to register their sexual encounters before their children's births,
rather than before two years after birth, since their children can be placed
for adoption immediately upon birth.
Often, biological fathers' subjective, timely affirmative action
regarding their unborn or born genetic offspring, where they acted as
soon as they knew and reasonably could have known about their
fatherhood, is irrelevant in adoption proceedings. Many laws demand
paternal action be taken before or shortly after birth, regardless of
circumstances. 126 These repose-like requirements operate to end
paternity opportunities even though the biological fathers later stepped
up to parenthood immediately upon learning of his child's birth. At
times, genetic fathers of non-marital children lose their parental rights
even though they came forward before any adoption proceeding had
begun or before an adoption was completed. 27 Failure to register or
otherwise to step up to parenthood due to a failure of knowledge of
pregnancy, or even the possibility of pregnancy, or birth frequently
caused by
provides no excuse, even where the failure was intentionally
28
lies about pregnancies, births, or possible genetic ties. 1
Even timely affirmative action toward parenthood under repose-type
provisions at or shortly after birth may be inadequate to prompt paternal
participation rights in adoptions. 129 Thus, filing a paternity case, as
Jonathan Lehr did, in a timely manner may not suffice when the statute
whereabouts from Jonathan until Jessica was one year old, she controlled Jonathan's
ability to be named as the father on the birth certificate or in a sworn statement; to be
married to Lorraine; to live openly with Lorraine and Jessica; or, to be adjudicated as the
father in a court proceeding. Id. at 250-51 (reviewing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 -a).
126. See, e.g., In re Petition of Doe, No. 1-92-1552, 1993 WL 330638, at *4 (111. App.
Aug. 18, 1993) (terminating a biological father's parental rights for failure to assume a
reasonable degree of concern for the newborn within 30 days of birth).
127. See, e.g., Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 361-67 (Minn. 2002) (holding
that biological father's consent to adoption and that he had missed his opportunity to file
with Minnesota paternity registry).
128. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 99-101 (S.D. 1996) (reviewing
several comparable rulings).
129. See, e.g., Heidbreder,645 N.W.2d at 361 (ruling genetic father lost participation
rights in an adoption proceeding though he filed with the paternity registry on day he
learned where the mother and child were, albeit one day late); In re Adoption of Baby
Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256 (Neb. 2001) (holding genetic father who filed timely petition to
adjudicate paternity, but in wrong court, lost paternal rights because his "ignorance of the
law" was inexcusable); Friehe v. Schaad, 545 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Neb. 1996) (contending
failure by genetic father to file notice of claim to paternity within five days of birth
precluded adoption participation rights, even where both parents were ignorant of this
law and where father tried to "work things out with mother" and offered to pay "medical
expenses of the birth").
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speaks only of filing a notice of having intercourse, even where in the
relevant adoption proceeding the court knew of the pending paternity
case. Courts' adherence to the "sheerest formalism" permits the
termination of constitutionally-protected paternity opportunities for dads
who timely step up in some way to parenthood because adoption statutes
are read in "grudging and crabbed"
ways contrary to the public policies
30
of dual parenthood and equality. 1
The draconian effects of state adoption laws on genetic fathers of
nonmarital children are illustrated by an Idaho statute which provides:
The legislature finds that an unmarried mother has a right to
privacy with regard to her pregnancy and adoption plan, and
therefore has no legal obligation to disclose the identity of an
unmarried biological father prior to or during an adoption
proceeding, and has no obligation
to volunteer information to the
3
court with respect to the father.' 1
Therefore, genetic dads with no knowledge of pregnancy or birth lose
participation rights in adoption proceedings involving their children
because they did not "track" the "condition" of the women with whom
they had sex. 132 Thus, it seems that stalking former lovers and bedmates
is invited. Parental acts by genetic fathers undertaken immediately upon
learning of pregnancy and
birth are too late, even when these children are
33
1
young.
very
very,
still
Recent changes in Florida adoption laws illustrate the increasing
foreclosure of any practical chance of parenthood for unwed genetic
130. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275.
131. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1501A(4) (West 2008). See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 7830-4.12(4) (West 2008).
132. Escobedo v. Nickita, 231 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Ark. 2006) (J. Brown, concurring)
("It occurs to me that Mr. Escobedo had some obligation to track Misty Ford's condition
after he had unprotected sex with her if he ever planned to claim notice of an adoption
and the paternity and custody of the resulting child.").
133. See In re C.L., Juvenile, 878 A.2d 207, 211 (Vt. 2005). In this case, the court said:
To conclude that petitioner acted promptly once he became aware of the child
is to fundamentally misconstrue whose timetable is relevant. Promptness is
measured in terms of the baby's life, not by the onset of the father's awareness.
The demand for prompt action by the father at the child's birth is neither
arbitrary nor punitive, but instead a logical and necessary outgrowth of the
State's legitimate interest in the child's need for early permanence and stability.
Some have suggested that adherence to such "formalism" when a genetic father
steps up as soon as he knew of his child, and before any adoption order, as in
Escobedo, is truly grounded on the fact that the prospective adoptive parents
were projected to be better caretakers than the genetic father.
Id. at 211 (C.J. Hannah, dissenting).

2008]

OUT OF CONTROL PATERNITY SCHEMES

fathers of nonmarital children who are placed for adoption. Prior to 2001,
unless "excused by the court," post-birth written consent to a proposed
adoption of a non-marital child was required of a genetic father who
established paternity by court proceedings; 134 signed and filed a paternity
acknowledgment; 135 or provided child support "in a repetitive, customary
manner." 136 Legislative initiatives expanded participation rights to
include possible genetic fathers who "attempted to provide" such
consistent support during the mother's pregnancy 137 as well as men
fathers. 138
reasonably "identified" by birth mothers as potential genetic
Moreover, in cases that lacked knowledge of the name or location of
those men from whom consent for adoption was required, including men
"identified" as potential fathers, Florida judges were required to question
hearings. 39
the mothers and their relatives who were present at adoption
Judges had to inquire about men who provided or promised to provide
support, 40 men with whom the mothers cohabitated at the time of
conception,141 and men whom the mothers had "reason to believe" could
be the genetic fathers. 142 As well, adoption entities were responsible for
undertaking, where necessary, "diligent" searches to locate these same
43
men once they were identified, if their locations remained unknown. 1 If
the men were still unidentified, or if their locations remained unknown
upon such inquiries, Florida laws required the mother or adoption entity
to publish notice to such men in newspapers in counties where
"conception may have occurred," where the mother resides, and where
the possible genetic fathers reside. 144 These notices were also to contain
physical descriptions of the genetic mothers and possible genetic fathers,
and the dates and cities where
as well as the birth dates of the children
' 45
conception "may have occurred."'

134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1) (West 2008).
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(l)(b)(4) (West 2008).
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1)(b)(5) (West 2008).
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.062(1)(d)(2) (West 2008); see also Act of April 18, 2001,
ch.3, § 3, 2001 Fla. Laws 5, 8.
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.062(1)(b)(5) (West 2008).
139. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.088(3) (West 2008).
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.088(3)(d) (West 2008).
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.088(3)(c) (West 2008).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. §63.088(3)(g) (West 2008).
143. FLA. STAT. § 63.088(4) (West 2008); see also In re Karen A.B., 513 A.2d 770,
772 (Del. 1986) (holding that when unwed mother is "unwilling to disclose the name of
the natural father," petition for adoption should "furnish detailed information concerning
the efforts made to identify and locate the natural father").
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088(5) (West 2008).
145. Id.
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Rightly so, the 2001 requirements for published notices to
unidentified or missing fathers were challenged. A Palm Beach County
circuit judge chiefly denied relief, 146 but a district court of appeal
correctly invalidated the so-called Scarlet Letter provisions on notice by
publication. 47 The court found that the Florida Constitution's right to
privacy encompasses individual interests both in avoiding disclosures of
personal matters and in making certain important decisions
48 The court
independently.
1
determined an invasion of these interests was
"patent." 149 The court concluded that the state did not meet its burden to
justify the "personal, intimate, and intrusive" nature of the constructive
notice provisions. 150 It said nothing more specific, however, about the
statutory requirements of judicial inquiry and diligent searches by
adoption entities for men who may be the fathers of the children placed
for adoption, though those provisions seemingly disallowed women to
make certain adoption decisions "independently."' 5
After the invalidation, Florida lawmakers unanimously passed a bill
in 2003 establishing the. "Florida Putative Father Registry."' 135 The
purpose was to "preserve the right to notice and consent to an
adoption.', 136 That goal was not met. The new law requires a man to
register with the state if he believes he may be a genetic father.' 37 Once
registered, a man gains a right to notification if the woman named in the
registry places a child for adoption. 13 8 A claim of paternity may be filed
at any time prior to the child's birth.139 A potential father cannot register,
however, if the mother has already initiated proceedings to terminate the
genetic father's parental rights.
Genetic fathers thus must file very
quickly. This new Florida law effectively denies paternity opportunities
to many fit genetic fathers who wish to parent, even where these same
146. G.P. v. State, 842 So. 2d 1059, 1061 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
147. G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1060-61.
148. Id. at 1062.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1063.
151. The Florida court is not alone in suggesting (as arguably it was not truly holding)
that maternal privacy interests include independent (i.e., exclusive) decision-making
authority by women regarding any adoption (or other matter) involving their newborn
nonmarital kids. Yet, as argued later, such interests are not compelled by federal
constitutional precedents and run counter to the asserted policies of dual parenthood and
parental equality.
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054 (West 2008).
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(1) (West 2008).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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men have continuing child support duties long after birth and long after
any significant chance for a meaningful parent-child relationship has
ended. The denials are more frequent now than before because more
responsibilities have shifted to unwed genetic fathers. The 2003 paternity
registry bill expressly says:
An unmarried biological father, by virtue of the fact that he has
engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be
on notice that a pregnancy and an adoption proceeding regarding
that child may occur and that he has a duty to protect his own
rights and interest. He is, therefore, entitled to notice of a birth or
with regard to that child only as provided in
adoption proceeding
14
this chapter.

1

Incidentally, such an approach may have implications outside of
adoption, such as when an unregistered genetic father seeks 42custody or
mother.
visitation of his genetic offspring still living with the
The new Florida law eliminated the general requirement of judicial
inquiries and diligent adoption-entity searches for, and advance consents
by, "any man who the mother has reason to believe may be the father...
and who

. . .

has been identified by the birth mother as a person she has

reason to believe may be the father." 143 However, the identities of
potential genetic fathers of nonmarital children placed for adoption were
more likely to be discovered before 2003. The 2001 statutes required that
those who petitioned, pending adoption, to terminate parental rights act
in "good faith" and undertake "diligent efforts" to find the men identified
by the mothers as the potential fathers. Under the 2003 amendments,
"diligent" searches 14 4 are only required for unwed genetic fathers who
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.088 (West 2008).
2007) (involving a birth
142. See, e.g., J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 249-50 (I11.

mother who opposed custody or visitation with a nonmarital child for a genetic father
who failed to register; genetic father initiated paternity suit and only then did mother and
her husband file an adoption case; court rejected putative father registry as a ground for
dismissing the paternity suit, but only because the registry law was written to apply only
to adoptions). Compare In re Swatek-Briggs, No. 07-0730, 2008 WL 239020 (Iowa Ct.
App. Jan. 30, 2008) (discussing a differing possible approach to paternity rights of
genetic fathers in custody and visitation proceedings where the birth mother continues to
parent; court looked to whether a genetic father, seeking paternity establishment, parental
rights and visitation, who shows up five years after birth, intentionally relinquished a
known right, in a setting where deceit by the mother and her husband, a presumed father,
arguably caused the genetic father to step up so late).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(l)(d)(3) (West 2008).
144. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.087(4)(d) (West 2005), invalidated by G.P., 842 So. 2d

1059.
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have already affirmatively stepped up by securing a judicial declaration
46
of paternity 145 or by officially claiming or acknowledging paternity.1
Also, since 2003, Florida courts now require the unwed genetic father's
consent to adoption only if he has stepped up in the ways mentioned and
either developed a "substantial" relationship with his child 147 or
"demonstrated a full commitment" to parental responsibility.4
Under the 2003 amendments, an unwed genetic father who is
unaware of the pregnancy or birth nevertheless has the "duty to protect
his own rights and interest" by filing "a notarized claim of paternity form
with the Florida Putative Father Registry within the Office of Vital
Statistics of the Department of Health."'' 49 Forms typically are
maintained in confidence. There is no judicial inquiry and no diligent
search, however, for a potential genetic father, even if he is identifiable
by the mother as the likely genetic father. 50 Additionally, a genetic
father seemingly is not excused from the filing requirement even if his
failure to file resulted from misrepresentations or deceit. Thus, the new
Florida laws expressly provide that where a newborn (less than six
months old) is placed with "adoptive parents," in order to participate in
the adoption proceeding, the unwed genetic father must have filed a
notarized claim of paternity form "prior to the time the mother executes
her consent for adoption.'' Under the new Florida laws, an unwed
genetic mother may consent to adoption forty-eight hours after birth, or
on the day she is notified that "she is fit to be released from the licensed
hospital or birth center.' 5 2 Consequently, the 2003 Florida statute leaves
very little time for many genetic fathers of nonmarital kids to step up,
including men who would be and want to be good fathers. 15 3 Men with
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(l)(b)(3) (West 2008).
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.062(1)(b)(4)-(5) (West 2008) (requiring affidavit or

acknowledgment).
147. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(a) (West 2008) (addressing children over six months
old placed for adoption).
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b) (West 2008) (addressing children less than six
months old placed for adoption).
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.054(1) (West 2008).
150. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 63.088(4)-(5) (West 2008) (requiring "diligent search" only
for man who was married to or lived with the mother, who was declared a father by a
court, who adopted, or who "acknowledged or claimed" paternity). Cf The Adoption
Place, Inc. v. Doe, No. M2007-01214-COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 4322014, at *3-5 (Tn. Ct.
App. Dec. 5, 2007) (finding that "diligent inquiry" by attorney for "unknown father"
includes interrogatories to mother who can remain unidentified).
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(2)(b) (West 2008).
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4)(b) (West 2008).
153. A greater chance for a genetic father to step up arises where the father is
identified by the mother prior to birth. Then, an "adoption entity" may serve the father
with "a notice of intended adoption plan at any time prior to the placement of the child in
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no real "control" under Lehr can lose participation rights in adoption
proceedings involving their offspring. Registering sexual encounters with
the state cannot reasonably be deemed to constitute a form of "control"
over parental opportunities. Many "responsible fathers" in Florida are
now omitted from the new adoption scheme.
Absolute maternal privacy rights, at least in adoption and safe haven
settings, as well as in settings where governments pay for childbirth
expenses, are not compelled by federal constitutional precedents. In fact,
they run contrary to the federal constitutional protections of paternity
opportunities recognized in Lehr.154 As well, as suggested by the dissent
in Lehr, they run contrary to the public policy involving a mother's duty
under TANF to cooperate "in good faith" in establishing legal paternity
for older children for whom welfare assistance is sought.' 5 5 Good faith
cooperation can be compelled in the welfare setting since mothers have
no constitutional entitlement to state aid. Therefore, governments can
the adoptive home." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.026(3)(a) (West 2008). The notice includes
details on how to step up and the expectations of support required by law for a father who
does step up. This notice can be served during pregnancy when an adoption immediately
after birth is contemplated, though the genetic father must be accorded at least thirty days
to act. See id; see also Heart of Adoption, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 203 (Fla. 2007).
While the court in J.A. spoke of a "diligent search" by the adoption entity for the genetic
father who is "known and locateable," J.A., 963 So. 2d at 203, it did so only in a case
where the father actually became aware of the pregnancy three months before birth and
before any search by the adoption entity had begun, and where the relevant statutory
provision on notice speaks only to "any unmarried biological father identified by the
mother or identified by a diligent search of the Florida Putative Father Registry." FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.062(3)(a) (West 2008). Neither the statute at issue nor the high court
majority in J.A. spoke of a pre-birth diligent search for a genetic father as yet unidentified
by the expectant mother. Cf The Adoption Place, 2007 WL 4322014 at * 1-4. Only one
concurring justice expressly recognized Lehr and the requirements it seemingly sets
regarding the reasonable opportunity of a biological father to develop a parent-child
relationship with an offspring placed for adoption. This justice apparently had the as yet
unidentified father in mind when he only concurred based on the belief "that the
protected interest of known, unmarried fathers in the opportunity to develop relationships
with their children in this adoption context must be recognized and addressed and operate
to guide any subsequent statutory construction." J.A., 963 So. 2d at 210 (Lewis, C.J.,
concurring); see also id. at 206 (finding "an independent basis" for protecting paternity
opportunities under the Florida Constitution's "Right to Privacy Clause").
154. Outside of the United States, and thus without Lehr, absolute maternal authority
in adoptions has been determined to be contrary to public policy, chiefly grounded on the
child's best interests and not on paternity interests. C v. XYZ County Council, 2007 WL
3389567 (Cal. App. Civ. Div. Nov. 23, 2007) (allowing young unwed mom to place child
for adoption without inquiries as to her family or to the father and his family where the
child is born from a one night stand, but only where the best interests of the four-month
old child-in foster care since birth-points to adoption).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2008).
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attach at least certain strings to any aid dispensed.156 Comparably,
mothers have no constitutional entitlement to abandon their children to
governments, whether in safe haven or adoption settings, or to have the
government pay for the expenses incurred for childbirth. 157 So unwed
mothers seeking government aid can have diminished privacy rights. If
they do, on public policy grounds governments must then ask why only
rich and single mothers should have unfettered discretion regarding
paternity designations. Should only unabandoned, unadopted fatherless
newborns have some real chance to bond later with their genetic dads?
Extending the limitations on maternal privacy rights to unwed mothers
seeking no state aid arguably raises more difficult questions. But these
questions can be answered in ways more protective of paternity
opportunity interests since maternal informational and decisional privacy
can be limited for good reason even when no strings are pulled. 58 While
the Scarlet Letter court did find that maternal privacy embodies interests
in making certain childrearing decisions independently,1 52 such privacy
interests cannot deprive many genetic fathers of their own privacy
interests. Independence from governmental interference does not require
independence from paternal participation.

156. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 625 (1987) (J. Brennan, dissenting)
("We are willing to accept the validity of many conditions on participation in
Government programs because this Court has never held that anyone has an absolute
right to receive public assistance. The Court has thus assumed that participation in a
benefit program reflects a decision by a recipient that he or she is better off by meeting
whatever conditions are attached to participation than not receiving benefits. In assessing
the burdens imposed by a program, then, the theory has been that whatever reasonable
burdens are borne by the recipient are willingly assumed.").
157. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[I]t is not a
fundamental right of any parent, male or female, to sever his or her financial
responsibilities to the child after the child is born."). In fact, at times governments
continue parental child support duties even after allowing or requiring parental rights to
be terminated. See, e.g., Illinois Dept. of Healthcare and Family Servs. v. Warner, 882
N.E.2d 557, 559 (II1. 2008) ("[S]upport payments were being used by the state to help
pay for the children's foster case.").
158. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness and Therese A. Clarke Arado, Safe Haven Laws:
Where Are the Daddies?, 36 CAP. U. L. REv. _ (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=-1012884 (last visited July 5, 2008). Cf Robert 0. v. Russell K.,
604 N.E.2d 99, 108 (N.Y. 1992) (noting an unwed mother's "personal- and perfectly
understandable-decisions to keep her pregnancy secret from" the genetic father and "to
surrender" her child for adoption without disclosing the father's identity).
152. G.P., 842 So.2d at 1062.
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VI. SYSTEMIC PATERNITY LAW REFORMS

Many "responsible fathers" of nonmarital children are omitted from
governmental paternity schemes where their exclusions, though founded
on governmental policy or custom, are beyond their "control," run
counter to federal constitutional paternity opportunity interests, and
undermine the generally recognized state policies on dual parenthood
and equality. Greater systemic protections of these interests are quite
"practicable" (and, in fact, relatively easy) for current state birth
certificate, safe haven, and adoption schemes.
In the birth certificate context, paternity opportunity interests are
unreasonably denied where state laws fail to address the means for
securing fathers under law for the half million nonmarital kids born each
year with no fathers named on their birth certificates. More fathers could
easily be secured, for example, by allowing greater chances for pre-birth
paternity designations. Pre-birth paternity registry is available for men in
order for them to secure participation rights during any later adoption
proceedings.153 But pre-birth voluntary paternity acknowledgments are
often not allowed.' 5 9 Prospective mothers and fathers normally know no
more about possible genetic ties later in pregnancies than they do at
birth.
As well, more fathers seemingly would be secured if birthing
hospitals were paid more than nominal sums for fully completed birth
certificates. 160 Encouragement, though not coercion, of identification of
actual or possible genetic fathers by hospital personnel should itself be
facilitated. Incidentally, a cost-benefit analysis may well show how
153. See, e.g., Requirements and Effects of PutativeFatherRegistries, 28 A.L.R. 349.
159. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-812(A) (2008) (allowing establishment of paternity for
"child born out of wedlock" via signed statement acknowledging paternity); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-10-120(a) (West 2008) (allowing acknowledgment of paternity "during the
child's minority"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1002(b) (West 2008) (using language
of "child conceived and born"); MINN. STAT. § 257.75(1) (West 2008) (using language of
"child born to a mother"); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-28 (West 2008) (using language of
"any child born out of wedlock"). But see Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-604(b) (West 2008)
("Acknowledgment of paternity ... may be signed before the birth of the child."); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 7571(e) (2004) ("Prenatal clinics shall offer prospective parents the
opportunity to sign a voluntary declaration of paternity."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-3.5
(West 2007) (providing for voluntary paternity acknowledgment "during the period
immediately prior to or following the child's birth"); IND. CODE § 16-37-2-2.1 (2008)
(providing for paternity acknowledgment "immediately before or after the birth of a child
who is born out of wedlock").
160. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7571(c) (2004) (providing that the "local child
support agency" pay ten dollars for "each completed declaration of paternity that is
filed").
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greater economic incentives for paternity establishments would lead to
far less governmental expenditures on welfare since more paternal child
support would be collected.
Further, there is only significant governmental inquiry postbirth on
the paternity of fatherless nonmarital children when welfare is sought.
Certainly, postbirth state promotions of more voluntary paternity
designations for fatherless children poses few dangers to maternal
privacy interests, as both mothers and fathers must sign. 16 The dual
parent and equality principles would, however, be significantly
promoted.
More legal fathers could also be secured shortly after birth simply
through postbirth follow-up measures by government officials (or their
designated agents, such as hospital personnel) 162 aimed at encouraging
(though not pressuring) new mothers to secure fathers under law for their
nonmarital children. 163 Between 1993 and 1995 in Illinois, for example,
a statute declared that the "person responsible for preparing and filing the
birth certificate ...shall make a reasonable effort to obtain the signatures
of both parents.' 6 4 Yet in Massachusetts (and elsewhere) today, genetic
father identification is strongly encouraged only when the child is placed
for adoption. The following Massachusetts adoption statute could be
adapted to cover fatherless newborns who are not placed for adoptions:
If an agency or person receiving a child born out of wedlock for
purposes of a subsequent adoption received from the child's
mother an executed consent form . . . and no person has
acknowledged paternity of the child.. . or has been adjudicated
the father of the child by any court ...then the person or agency
shall request that the mother voluntarily provide a sworn written
statement . . . that identifies the child's father and his current or
last known address. Any such statement shall be used solely for

161. State signature requirements are driven by federal law requiring both "father and
mother" to sign. 42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(5)(D)(i)(I)-(II) (2008).
162. Hospital personnel are in the best position to help undertake effective and
inexpensive follow-up procedures. Upon live birth, they have health care duties to both
the mothers and their children.
163. One reporter observes that over one half of all nonmarital kids are bom to mothers
who cohabitate with the genetic father. Irene Sege, Marry, Marry? Quite Contrary. The
Number of CohabitatingCouples with Kids is on the Rise, BOSTON GLOBE, July 24, 2007,
at El.
164. Law of 1993, II1. Pub. Act 88-159 (amended 1995) (current version at 410 ILL.
COMP. STAT. § 535.12(4) (2008)).
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the person named as the father of the
the purpose of notifying
65
1
child.
the
status of
In the safe haven setting, infant abandonment schemes could be
altered to require two parent approval.1 66 More sensibly, safe haven laws
could simply be eliminated. Little, if anything, would be lost since these
67
laws do not promote very well the stated objectives.1 But much would
be gained. Safe haven schemes unduly infringe upon the paternity
interests of genetic fathers as they allow maternal abandonment without
any concerns for potential or actual father-child relationships.
Opportunities for maternal abandonments are not themselves required by
any recognized constitutional privacy rights. American state and federal
governments have never generally allowed any parent walk away from
parental responsibilities simply because he/she felt like it.
Further, some safe haven laws allow infringements on maternal
privacy because they facially permit a nonmaternal abandonment with no
inquiries to the abandoner allowed. Here, maternal childrearing rights,
clearly vested since birth, 168 are ignored. Of course, safe haven laws may
not be followed literally. Imagine the case when a man rather than a
woman seeks to abandon a newborn at a police station with no questions
asked. Can anyone imagine the officers typically letting the abandoning
(alleged) father walk away silently, regardless of what the statutes say?

165. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, § 2 (2008). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-1-111
(2008) ("An unmarried birth mother has a right of privacy with regard to the mother's
pregnancy and adoption plan. Birth mothers are encouraged to provide all known
information about the birth father of any child for whom an adoption is planned.").
166. While resembling in some ways parental termination hearings during adoption
proceedings, safe haven parent approval procedures may not need to involve a best
interests analysis.
167. See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 119, at 829 (arguing that while safe haven laws seek
"to save infants from dumpsters," their "enduring and subtle achievement" is less
"criminological" and more "cultural," i.e. promoting a culture of life values); see also id.
at 758 (arguing that, at best, safe haven laws only "possibly" prevent harm to newborns,
and then just prevent "only a little" harm).
168. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3623.01(B), (D) (2008) (stating that "parent or
agent of a parent voluntarily delivers the parent's newborn" and providing that parent or
agent of parent "may remain anonymous" and may not be required "to answer any
questions"). See also ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 39-8203(l)(b), (3) (2008) (stating that child
delivered to safe haven by "custodial parent," and providing that safe haven "shall not
inquire as to the identity of the custodial parent"). See also WYO. STAT. § 14-11-103(a)
(providing that parent or parent's designee may relinquish a newborn child to a safe
haven provider); id. § 14-11-103 (c) (stating that provider "may presume that the person
relinquishing is the child's parent or parent's designee"); id. § 14-11-103(d) (stating that
provider "may not require that any information be given").
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Non-safe haven, post-infancy child abandonment by parents are only
allowed after significant state inquiries, usually focusing on the child's
best interests. Parental duties to children under law are not absolutely
discretionary with the parents.' 69 Similar policies apply to newborns and
older children alike.
Safe haven laws, even though rarely employed, also send the wrong
message about genetic fathers. Post-birth settings under Lehr differ from
pregnancy settings under Roe v. Wade. Maternal privacy rights differ in
post-birth and pre-birth settings. Safe haven abandonment laws must
themselves be abandoned.
In the adoption arena, paternity interests are infringed when a genetic
father's failure to register his earlier sexual encounter with the state, or to
step up to the parenthood very soon after birth, can foreclose
participation in a later adoption proceeding regardless of the
circumstances surrounding his failure (i.e., deceit), how easy he is to
locate, and when he actually steps up. In adoption settings, as in welfare
and safe haven settings, there are also only limited maternal privacy
interests that must be accommodated.1 70 Here too, genetic mothers have
no constitutionally-protected right to walk away from parenthood under
law. The strings of "good faith" cooperation could be employed. Yet,
during many adoption proceedings there is no general duty to investigate
paternity in order to discover genetic fathers whose potential or realized
parental interests will be lost. During some adoption proceedings there is
a duty to investigate paternity when there is reason to think there were
factual misrepresentations (or errors) in the words of birth mothers,
prospective adopting parents, or adoption facilitators. 171 Thus, informal
or off-the-record misrepresentations by unwed mothers to genetic fathers
about pregnancy or paternity often are not revealed and usually do not
excuse the men from compliance with rather demanding requirements for
169. See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 580 (1987) ("[P]utative father has no
legitimate right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial obligations to his
natural child that are validly imposed by state law.").
170. One such interest involves nondisclosure of the name of the mother placing her
child for adoption. The Adoption Place, 2007 WL 4322014, at *4. But see Cecilly L.
Helms & Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers:An Unwed Mother's Right to
Privacy in Adoption Proceedings,20 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 39-40 (2005) (arguing that a
father's rights in adoption should not depend on a birth mother's disclosures because she
has a fundamental right to privacy); E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of
Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological
Father's Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 97, 111 (2006) (arguing that a
birth mother's "constitutional right to direct moral upbringing of her child should include
...the power to prevent another from becoming a parent to her child").
171. See Douglas H. Reiniger, Wrongful Adoption: Duty to Investigate Birth Parent
Information, ADOPTION LAW INSTITUTE (2007).
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securing adoption participation rights. These requirements typically
child-support that
include pre-birth paternity registrations or significant
172
is provided both pre-birth and shortly after birth.
So, during many adoption proceedings there are no "diligent"
searches conducted for the genetic fathers where unwed mothers pursue
adoptions for their children with no fathers designated on birth
certificates. 73 Not infrequently, more governmental concern is shown
for
for prospective adoptive parents, with few family bonds as yet, than 74
1
genetic fathers interested in parenting, but unaware of their offspring.
Finally, there is little accommodation in adoptions for the latearriving father who stepped up to parenthood very soon after he learned
of the pregnancy, birth and potential adoption, where such parenting
occurred when the child was an infant and preceded the development of
any strong familial relationship between the child and the prospective
adopter(s), or even preceded the identification of prospective adopter(s).
Bad parents typically get reunification services after their children are
removed due to abuse or neglect, meaning that even some very bad acts
do not necessarily result in the termination of parental rights. Putative
172. See, e.g., In re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d at 99-101 (reviewing several
comparable rulings); see also In re Paternity of Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. App.
2000) (reviewing adoption cases involving late-arriving genetic fathers).
173. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12(d)(3) (West 2008) (proposed adoption not
noticed to biological father where there was no pregnancy support, attempt to legitimate,
or the like, as shown by mother's affidavit); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-26(h) (West 2008)
(identity and last known address of biological father can be included in mother's
affidavit, but "the mother shall have the right not to disclose the name and address of the
biological father of her child should she so desire"). See also In Matter of Adoption of N,
673 P.2d 864 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding no notice of adoption of unwed mother's child
sent to genetic father as he did not initiate filiations proceedings before child's placement
for adoption, although mother "had named the putative father" in her paperwork for the
placement agency (indicating a one night stand); acknowledging that the father may be
unaware of the child's existence; finding no due process violation though the case is
different, and perhaps more difficult, than Lehr).
174. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-12 (West 2007) (finding that state has "a
compelling interest . . . in preventing the disruption of adoption placements" and that
prospective adoptive parents have liberty and privacy interests in retaining custody;
finding also that a genetic father, who is not a "legal father," has only an "inchoate
interest" in his biological child placed for adoption which can be "lost by failure to
develop a familial bond with the child" and "has a duty to protect his own rights and
interests" which may be lost though the father had a "subjective intent" to parent); see
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.022 (West 2008) (finding that while an unmarried mother
placing child for adoption "is entitled to privacy" and the "state has a compelling interest
... in preventing the disruption of adoptive placements," an unmarried biological father
had only "an inchoate" interest that must be acted upon "both during the pregnancy and
after the child's birth"). Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.053(3) (West 2008) ("The Legislature
finds that a birth mother and a birth father have a right to privacy.").
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fathers, however, usually receive very little leeway though they would be
fit parents and though their failures to step up to parenthood involve
more negligence or mistake than crime.' 75 The "sheerest formalism" and
"grudging and crabbed" legal doctrines systematically stifle many
responsible fathers in adoption proceedings for reasons beyond their
actual control.154 At least Jonathan Lehr knew for two years that he had a
daughter whom he could seek to parent. Many biological fathers lose
their children to adoptions before they even learned of their offspring.
VII. CONCLUSION

In August, 2007, California Appeals Court Judge Paul Coffee
17 6
repeated his "frustration over the state of the law in paternity cases."
After urging legislative reform he asked the same question I now ask: "Is
anyone listening?"'177 The systematic denials of genetic fathers' paternity
opportunity interests in their nonmarital kids in birth certificate, safe
haven and adoption settings must be ended. There are feasible systemic
reforms that will promote much better dual and equal parenthood without
burdening constitutional maternal privacy interests. Legal paternity
should not be lost by genetic fathers of nonmarital kids because their
mothers wish to parent alone or wish strangers or others to parent. Safe
haven laws should not deny legal paternity to genetic fathers of
nonmarital kids where the men had little, if any, real "control" over
175. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.301(1) (2008) (providing that father of child born
to unwed mother gets no notice of adoption unless registered with father's adoption
registry; providing also that existing father will not have parental rights terminated unless
abandonment, continuous failure to support "without good cause," "consistent pattern" of
bad parenting, or out-of-home placement plan that has not led to correction of conditions
leading to the placement). See also In re E.A.W.S., No. 2-06-00031-CV, 2006 WL
3525367, at *18 (Tex. App. Dec. 7 2006) (reversing order terminating father's parental
rights as state failed to make reasonable efforts to return child to father after child was
placed with paternal aunt); In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ind. App. 2008) (finding that
unwed father, assumed to have parental rights, "had not established paternity" nor shown
an ability or willingness to appropriately parent: "yet, though child was made ward of the
state and removed from mother, the "sole legal custodian," the father was still afforded a
"participation plan" involving, e.g., parenting and drug use assessments and only later
lost parental rights because bad parenting conditions had not been remedied); Adoption
of Hayden T., No. Al 18580, 2008 WL 442628, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2008)
(holding that, before father's rights are ended in order to allow adoption, "comprehensive
report" by neutral party is needed, as are specific findings, including findings on best
interests of the child).
154. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 275 (White J., dissenting).
176. Ventura County Dept. of Child Support Servs. v. V.F., 2d Civ. No. B191218,
2007 WL 2391262, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007).
177. Id. at *4.
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establishing parent-child relationships, especially if they step up to
parenthood when their kids are still young and especially if their kids
have not yet been finally placed with prospective adoptive parents.178
Constitutional and other public policies have never supported denying fit
dads their parental opportunities for nonmarital kids even though the
moms might object and even though there may be more fit potential
parents.

178. The unfairness of such losses has even been recognized by courts imposing rigid
statutory guidelines on genetic fathers who knew about the pregnancies, if not the births.
See, e.g., Helen G. v. Mark J.H., 175 P.3d 914, 925 (N.M. 2007) ("We are mindful of the
fact that there may be biological fathers who do not know or who have no reason to know
that they have fathered a child. In such a case, a father may not be able to take action
prior to the filing of the adoption petition, because the petition may be the first notice he
receives that a child has even been conceived. Additionally, there may be biological
fathers whose offers of support are affirmatively rejected by the biological mother and
who only receive notice of the pending adoption through the filing of the adoption
petition. These situations present special statutory and constitutional considerations that
are not present in this appeal.").

